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Ashley J. Thomas* and Barbara W. Sarnecka
Sarnecka Cognitive Development Lab, Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
A person’s belief about whether intelligence can change (called their implicit theory of
intelligence) predicts something about that person’s thinking and behavior. People who
believe intelligence is fixed (called entity theorists) attribute failure to traits (i.e., “I failed
the test because I’m not smart.”) and tend to be less motivated in school; those who
believe intelligence is malleable (called incremental theorists) tend to attribute failure to
behavior (i.e., “I failed the test because I didn’t study.”) and are more motivated in school.
In previous studies, researchers have characterized participants as either entity or
incremental theorists based on their agreement or disagreement with three statements.
The present study further explored the theories-of-intelligence (TOI) construct in two
ways: first, we asked whether these theories are coherent, in the sense that they show
up not only in participants’ responses to the three standard assessment items, but on a
broad range of questions about intelligence and the brain. Second, we asked whether
these theories are discrete or continuous. In other words, we asked whether people
believe one thing or the other (i.e., that intelligence is malleable or fixed), or if there is
a continuous range of beliefs (i.e., people believe in malleability to a greater or lesser
degree). Study (1) asked participants a range of general questions about the malleability
of intelligence and the brain. Study (2) asked participants more specific questions about
the brains of a pair of identical twins who were separated at birth. Results showed
that TOI are coherent: participants’ responses to the three standard survey items are
correlated with their responses to questions about the brain. But the theories are not
discrete: although responses to the three standard survey items fell into a bimodal
distribution, responses to the broader range of questions fell into a normal distribution
suggesting the theories are continuous.
Keywords: implicit theories of intelligence, essentialism, folk psychology, naïve biology
Introduction
Suppose your 10-years-old daughter comes bouncing through the front door, proudly waving
a report card full of A’s. Do you say, (a) “You’re so smart!” or (b) “You worked so hard!”? If
you study motivation, you undoubtedly choose (b), because of the many studies showing that
praising children for eﬀort (rather than intelligence) encourages them to believe that intelligence
is malleable. In the literature, this is called having an ‘incremental’ theory of intelligence,
or being an ‘incremental theorist’ (see Dweck, 2000 for review). Incremental theorists see
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challenging situations as opportunities to learn. They persevere
on diﬃcult tasks and attribute their failures to controllable factors
(i.e., “I failed because I didn’t study.”). The opposite of an
incremental theorist is an ‘entity theorist,’ someone who views
intelligence as a ﬁxed entity. Entity theorists see challenging
situations as tests of intelligence. They give up sooner than
incremental theorists and attribute their failures to ﬁxed traits
(i.e., “I failed because I am dumb”; Mueller and Dweck, 1998;
Kamins and Dweck, 1999; Dweck, 2000; Blackwell et al., 2007;
Gunderson et al., 2013). In other words, a person’s theory of
intelligence (speciﬁcally, their belief about whether intelligence
is a ﬁxed entity or an incrementally developing skill) aﬀects that
person’s thinking and behavior in important ways. The present
study asks two questions about theories of intelligence (TOI):
ﬁrst, are they coherent? Second, are they discrete or continuous?
Coherence and Breadth of Theories of
Intelligence
Calling these beliefs theories implies that they are rich, structured
modes of reasoning (e.g., Dweck et al., 1995a; Aronson et al.,
2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Miele and Molden, 2010). But
most researchers diagnose participants’ TOI using the same
three items: (1) Your intelligence is something about you that
you can’t change very much. (2) You have a certain amount of
intelligence and you can’t do much to change it. (3) You can learn
new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.
People who agree with these statements are entity theorists; those
who disagree are incremental theorists (see Dweck et al., 1995a
for review). In other domains, folk theories (also called naïve
theories) do appear coherent. This has been shown with folk
theories of cosmology (Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992), evolution
(Shtulman and Schulz, 2008; Shtulman and Calabi, 2012), matter
(Smith, 2007), motion (Caramazza et al., 1981), and physics
(Lautrey and Mazens, 2004). In the present study, we wanted
to ﬁnd out whether folk TOI are similarly coherent. If so, then
we should expect to ﬁnd strong correlations between people’s
responses to the three standard assessment items and their
responses to other questions about the malleability of intelligence
and the brain. For example, entity theorists might be expected
to believe that a person’s brain is determined more by their
genetics than their environment, whereas incremental theorists
might believe that a person can change their brain with practice
(just as they believe that a person can change their intelligence if
they practice).
One reason to expect that people’s theories are coherent comes
from the literature on psychological essentialism. Essentialism is a
mode of reasoning based on the intuition that natural kinds have
underlying ‘essences’ that are responsible for their observable
traits. These essences are assumed to be invisible, extremely
diﬃcult to change, and biologically based. An example of an
essence is IQ: people who essentialize intelligence often imagine
IQ as the invisible and unchanging essence that causes a person to
succeed or fail at intellectual tasks (Gelman, 2005). Gelman et al.
(2007) found that people’s essentialist beliefs about intelligence
are coherent. People who believe that intelligence is ﬁxed (i.e.,
entity theorists) tend to also believe that it is biologically based
and a pervasive part of one’s personality. Conversely, people who
believe that intelligence are malleable (i.e., incremental theorists)
tend to reject essentialist assumptions. Thus, if TOI are coherent,
then participants’ responses to the three standard assessment
items should correlate with their beliefs about genetics and
environmental inﬂuences on the developing brain.
In the present study, we asked participants questions
about the developing brain. The questions were divided into
six thematic categories, chosen to reﬂect a broad range of
possible inﬂuences on the brain. In alphabetical order, these
categories were: (1) Brain Basis Traits: If entity theorists
have a coherent and essentialized view of intelligence, they
should be more likely than incremental theorists to attribute
psychological characteristics to physical properties of the brain.
(2) Environment: similarly, incremental theorists should assign
the environment a greater role in brain development than
entity theorists do. (3) Innateness: Entity theorists should be
more likely than incremental theorists to believe that intellectual
characteristics are innate. (4) Learning: Incremental theorists
should be more likely than entity theorists to believe that learning
changes the brain. (5) Practice: Similarly, incremental theorists
should be more willing to believe that practicing changes the
brain. (6) Willful Control: incremental theorists should be more
likely to say that individuals have some control over how their
brains develop.
Are Theories of Intelligence Categorical or
Continuous?
Unlike most research using the theories-of-intelligence construct,
the analyses by Gelman et al. (2007) suggest that people’s
beliefs about intelligence may fall anywhere along a continuous
spectrum from very essentialized to not-at-all essentialized,
rather than falling into the two distinct groups that are
typically discussed in the TOI literature (i.e., entity theorists
and incremental theorists). Thus, the second question we ask
in the present paper is: are TOI discrete or continuous? In
other words, do people tend to hold one theory or the other
(i.e., are people either entity theorists or incremental theorists)?
Or do these beliefs lie on a continuum? In the present paper,
we explored this in two ways. First, we gave participants
the three standard assessment items, but included a neutral
answer option so that participants were not forced to choose
one side or the other. Second, we looked at the distribution
of responses for both the three standard assessment items,
and for a broader range of statements about intelligence and
brain development. If people naturally fall into two camps in
their thinking about intelligence, the distribution of responses
should be bimodal, with entity theorists producing one cluster




All research activities were overseen and approved by the
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Participants
Participants included 220 adults who were paid $1.00 each to
complete a survey over the internet. Participants were recruited
through the Amazon Mechanical Turk System for Human
Intelligence Tasks. The survey included four items meant to
check if participants were reading carefully (e.g., “There are
consistent diﬀerences between the brains of aliens and humans.
Please answer ‘disagree.”’) If participants did not answer as
directed, their data were excluded; 27 participants’ data were
excluded for this reason. Reported age of the remaining 193
participants ranged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 33.5);
reported genders were male (n = 105, 54%), transgender (n = 1,
0.05%) and female (n = 87, 45%). Participants also indicated
their race/ethnicity by choosing from a list: responses included
white/Caucasian (n = 147, 76.96%); Asian/Paciﬁc Islander
(n = 17, 8.9%); black/African–American (n = 10, 5.24%);
Chicano/Latino (n = 13, 6.81%) and Native American/Alaska
Native (n = 2, 1.05%). Two participants (1.05%) declined
to report their race/ethnicity. Participants were also asked to
indicate the highest level of education they had completed.
Answers included post-graduate degree (n = 13, 6.74%), some
graduate school (n = 11, 5.7%); Bachelor’s degree (n = 68,
35.23%), Associate’s degree (n = 21, 10.88%); some college, no
degree (n = 53, 27.46%), high school or equivalent (n = 25,
12.0%), and less than high school (n = 2, 1.04%).
Materials and Procedure
The survey included 45 items. These 45 included the four
reading-check items and the four demographic questions
mentioned above; the remaining 37 items formed the basis for
the analysis. The four reading check questions and the remaining
37 items were presented in a random order. The 37 items
included the three standard assessment theory-of-intelligence
items used in previous studies; eight items on intelligence and
essentialism, and 26 items on brain development and plasticity.
Each question used a ﬁve point Likert scale that was appropriate
for the statement. Usually ranging from “Strongly disagree” to
“Strongly agree” (See Supplementary Materials for a complete list
of questions and possible responses).
Standard assessment items for theory of intelligence
(three items)
As noted in the introduction, most studies assess participants’
TOI by asking them to agree or disagree with these three
statements (Dweck et al., 1995a). We used the same statements,
but gave participants a ﬁve point Likert scale that ranged from
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly Agree” and included a “neutral”
response, instead of a six point Likert scale that is usually used.
The three standard questions are:
1. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change
very much.
2. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you can’t do
much to change it.
3. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your
basic intelligence.
Essentialism (eight items)
We used these items to explore the essentialism in participants’
thinking about intelligence by asking whether intelligence is
biologically based, diﬃcult to change, present at birth and
pervasive (Haslam et al., 2006; Gelman et al., 2007). For example,
“Being intelligent has broad ramiﬁcations: it inﬂuences people’s
behavior in a wide variety of situations and in many aspects
of their lives.” (A complete list of survey items appears on the
supplemental materials.)
The brain (26 items)
We used these items to explore participants’ beliefs about
the brain. The statements belonged to six thematic categories
(presented here in alphabetical order).
Brain basis of traits (seven items)
These items asked whether people with diﬀerent traits have
diﬀerent brains. For example, “There are consistent diﬀerences
between the brains of people who are intelligent and the brains of
people who are not intelligent.”
Environment (three items)
These items asked whether the environment aﬀects brain
development. For example, “Depending on environment, a child’s
brain will develop in diﬀerent ways.”
Innateness (five items)
These items asked whether the characteristics of people’s
brains at birth determine their future abilities. For example,
“The characteristics of a person’s brain at birth is the largest
determining factor in whether or not that person will be
considered a genius later in life.”
Learning (five items)
These items asked participants whether learning changes the
brain. For example, “There is a lasting change in a person’s brain
after he or she learns how to count to ten.”
Practice (four items)
These items asked whether practicing a skill changes the brain.
For example, “If a person practices speaking a new language, their
brain will change as a result.”
Willful control (two items)
These items asked whether people have control over their brains.
For example, “A person can change their brain if they want to.”
Results and Discussion
Our overall analytical approach was to compare participant’s
theory-of-intelligence scores (as measured by the three standard
assessment items) to their responses on the eight Essentialism
items and the 26 Brain items. We considered p-values under
0.006 to be signiﬁcant, after a Bonferonni correction for multiple
analyses (0.05/8) because we used the theory of intelligence
questions in eight separate analyses.
We also looked at the distributions of responses. To avoid
making a priori assumptions about whether TOI are continuous
or discrete, we included both analyses using simple linear
regression (which treat theory-of-intelligence as a continuous
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variable) and one-way ANOVAs (which treat it as a categorical
variable). We also wanted to include the ANOVAs in order to
make it easier to compare our ﬁndings to the rest of the literature,
which treats theory-of-intelligence as a categorical variable.
Standard Assessment for Theory of Intelligence
(Three Items)
We started by averaging each participant’s responses to the three
standard assessment items to create their theory-of-intelligence
score. Mean scores ranged from 1 to 5 (M = 2.77, SD = 1.02)
with higher scores indicating a stronger belief that intelligence
is ﬁxed. There was no correlation between participants’ ages and
their theory-of-intelligence scores (R2 = 0.001, p = 0.288); nor
was there an eﬀect of gender [F(2,190) = 0.708, p = 0.494]
or race [F(6,186) = 0.624, p = 0.711]. There was, however, a
marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of education level [F(6,186) = 2.12,
p = 0.053]. Post hoc comparisons showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between participants who had ‘some college but no degree’ and
people with bachelor’s degrees [t(112) = 2.864, p = 0.005] and
also between people who had ‘some college but no degree’ and
people who had ‘some graduate school’ [t(15)= 2.687, p= 0.017].
People who indicated that they had ‘some college but no degree’
saw intelligence as more malleable than those with bachelor’s
degrees and those who had some graduate school. There was also
a diﬀerence between those who had ‘graduated high school or
equivalent’ and those with ‘some graduate school’ [t(24) = 2.06,
p = 0.05] where people who had graduated high school saw
intelligence as more malleable than those with ‘some graduate
school.’ Treating education level as a continuous variable (i.e.,
from 1 to 7) there was a small but signiﬁcant correlation between
theory of intelligence scores and education level (R2 = 0.042,
p < 0.005) where people who were more educated believed
intelligence to be more ﬁxed.
Sorting into theory-of-intelligence groups
Most studies in the TOI literature use a six-point scale, which
includes no neutral response. On that scale, every response is
either on the entity side or on the incremental side of the scale.
We used a ﬁve-point scale so that participants could answer
‘neutral’ if they wanted. Studies using the six-point scale typically
sort participants into groups by splitting the scale down the
middle: people with mean scores of 1–3 are called incremental
theorists; those with mean scores of 4–6 are called entity theorists,
and those whose means fall in between 3 and 4 are excluded
from the analyses (Dweck et al., 1995b). In order to make our
ﬁndings easier to compare with the rest of the literature, we also
sorted participants into categories (i.e., entity theorists, neutral
and incremental theorists) based on their TOI scores. We did
this by separating the responses into terciles: participants with
mean scores from 1 to 2.332 were labeled incremental theorists
(n = 81); those with scores from 2.333 to 3.666 were labeled
neutral theorists (n = 50); those with scores from 3.667 to 5 were
labeled entity theorists (n = 62).
Essentialism (Eight Items)
We calculated an essentialism score for each person by averaging
over the eight essentialism questions. These scores ranged from
1.5 to 4.63 (M = 3.30, SD = 0.52) where higher scores indicate a
more essentialized view of intelligence. There was no correlation
between people’s age and these scores (R2 = 0.00, p = 0.678)
no was there eﬀects of education [F(6,186) = 0.81, p = 0.565]
race [F(6,186) = 1.58, p = 0.168], or gender [F(2,190) = 2.06,
p = 0.13].
Coherence of theories of intelligence with essentialism
Participants’ TOI scores were correlated with their responses to
the essentialism questions. Treating TOI as continuous, we found
that the more a person endorsed an ‘entity’ TOI (as measured
by the three standard assessment items), the more they saw
intelligence as essentialized: that is, biologically based, pervasive,
and diﬃcult to change (R2 = 0.40, p < 0.001). Treating TOI
as categorical, there was a main eﬀect of TOI on essentialism
responses [F(2,190) = 80.94, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.460]. Tukey
contrasts show that incremental theorists rejected essentialist
statements the most, followed by neutral theorists and then entity
theorists (entity and incremental [t(141) = 13.40, p < 0.001]
entity and neutral [t(92) = 6.94, p < 0.001] and neutral and
incremental [t(106) = 4.59, p< 0.001; see Figure 1]).
Questions about the Brain (26 items)
We calculated each person’s beliefs about the brain by averaging
across the 26 brain items. The mean scores for these brain
questions ranged from 1.96 to 4.36 (M = 3.4, SD = 0.329)
where higher scores indicate that a person believes the brain is
malleable. There was no correlation between people’s age and
these scores (R2 = 0.01, p = 0.29) nor was there eﬀects of
education [F(6,186) = 0.38, p = 0.862] race [F(6,186) = 0.470,
p = 0.830], or gender [F(2,190) = 2.27, p = 0.11].
Coherence of theories of intelligence with beliefs about the
brain
Participants’ responses to the three standard assessment TOI
questions were also consistent with their responses to the brain
questions. If we treat TOI as continuous, we can say that the
more a person believed intelligence to be changeable, the more
they endorsed statements about the brain itself being plastic
(R2 = 0.313, p < 0.001). If we treat TOI as discrete categories,
a one-way ANOVA showed a main eﬀect of TOI on questions
about the brain [F(2,190) = 36.11, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.275]. Tukey
contrasts showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between all three of the
TOI categories (entity and incremental [t(122) = 7.74, p< 0.001]
entity and neutral [t(104) = 4.185, p < 0.001] and neutral and
entity [(t(57) = 4.6 p< 0.001; see Figure 2]).
We also looked at the relations between participants’ TOI
scores and their responses to the diﬀerent subtypes of brain items.
Below, we report the results for each item subtype in order of
eﬀect size, beginning with the largest.
Willful control (two items)
There was a strong correlation between TOI scores and
responses to the two items about willful control, such as “A
person can change their brain if they want to.” (R2 = 0.30,
p < 0.001). The more a participant believed that intelligence
was malleable, the more they thought that people have control
over their brains. Treating TOI as a categorical variable, we
found a main eﬀect of TOI group on the Willful Control items
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FIGURE 1 | Essentialism scoresby theory of intelligence (TOI). Mean level of agreement with statements such as “People who have intelligence will tend to
display it in a consistent manner, showing it in different situations and with different people,” by participants in the different TOI groups. Error bars indicate SE.
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Theories of intelligence and beliefs about brain plasticity. Mean level of agreement with statements such as “There is a lasting change in a
person’s brain after he or she learns a new language,” by participants in the different TOI groups. Error bars indicate SE. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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[F(2,190) = 30.2, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.241]. Tukey comparisons
revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between all three groups, where
incremental theorists most agreed that people have control over
their brains, entity theorists most disagreed with this idea;
and neutral theorists fell in between [entity and incremental
t(131) = 7.72, p < 0.001] entity and neutral [t(106) = 4.07,
p < 001] and neutral and incremental [t(106) = 3.03,
p< 0.01].
Innateness (five items)
There was a strong correlation between TOI scores and
judgments about the innateness of brain characteristics, such as
“The characteristics of a person’s brain at birth is the largest
determining factor in whether or not that person will be
considered a genius later in life.” (R2 = 0.22, p < 0.001). The
more a participant believed that intelligence is ﬁxed, the more
they believed that a baby’s brain at birth determines his or her
future intellectual abilities, including learning how to read, being
able to learn calculus and being a genius. Treating TOI as a
categorical variable, we found a main eﬀect of TOI group on
the Innateness items [F(2,189) = 26.31, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.218].
Tukey comparisons revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between all
three groups, where entity theorists most endorsed the idea that
brain changes are determined by genetics; incremental theorists
most disagreed with this idea; and neutral theorists fell in
between [incremental and neutral t(134)= 7.01, p< 0.001; entity
and neutral t(109) = 4.34, p < 001; neutral and incremental
t(121) = 2.73, p< 0.05].
Brain basis of traits (seven items)
There was a small but signiﬁcant correlation between TOI scores
and judgments about whether people with diﬀerent traits have
corresponding diﬀerences in their brains, such as, “There are
consistent diﬀerences between the brains of people who are
good at math and people who are bad at math” (R2 = 0.11,
p < 0.001). The more a participant believed that intelligence
is malleable, the more they thought that people with diﬀerent
traits had corresponding brain diﬀerences. Treating TOI as a
categorical variable, we found a small, but signiﬁcant eﬀect on
these responses [F(2,190) = 8.33, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.081]. Tukey
comparisons revealed that the ‘entity’ group diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from the other two groups, in that entity theorists were less
likely than the other two groups to believe that traits correspond
to brain characteristics [entity and incremental t(141) = 3.91,
p < 0.001; entity and neutral t(106) = 3.43, p < 0.005; neutral
and incremental t(126) = 0.652, p = 1.0].
Environment (three items)
There was a small but signiﬁcant correlation between TOI scores
and judgments about whether the environment plays a role in
brain development and (R2 = 0.087, p < 0.001). The more
a participant believed that intelligence is malleable, the more
they thought that the environment aﬀects brain development.
Treating TOI as a categorical variable, we found a small, but
signiﬁcant eﬀect on these responses [F(2,190) = 7.27, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.072]. Tukey comparisons revealed that the ‘entity’ group
diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the other two groups, in that entity
theorists were less likely than the other two groups to attribute
brain characteristics to the environment [entity and incremental
t(132) = 3.70, p < 0.001; entity and neutral t(110) = 2.26,
p< 0.05; neutral and incremental t(116) = 1.375, p = 0.172].
Practice (four items)
There was a small but signiﬁcant correlation between TOI scores
and beliefs about whether practicing skills changes a person brain
(R2 = 0.05, p = 0.002). The more a participant believed that
intelligence is malleable, the more they thought that practicing
changes the brain. Treating TOI as a categorical variable, we
found a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of TOI category on whether
participants believed practicing skills changes a person’s brain
[F(2,190)= 4.79, p= 0.009, η2 = 0.038] Tukey contrasts revealed
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence only between the incremental and the
entity theorists [t(112) = 2.77, p = 0.02].
Learning (five items)
The group of survey items least correlated with TOI scores
were those asking whether learning is associated with changes
in the brain. Most participants agreed that it is: for example,
72% of participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement,
“Learning is due to modiﬁcations in the brain”; and 90% agreed
or strongly agreed that, “There is a lasting change in the brain
when someone learns a new skill.” Using the Bonferroni-adjusted
alpha level of 0.006, we found that the correlation between TOI
scores and responses to these questions did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance (R2 = 0.036, p= 0.008). Treating TOI as a categorical
variable, the main eﬀect of TOI category on responses to these
survey items also was not signiﬁcant [F(2,190)= 3.412, p= 0.035,
η2 = 0.035].
Are Theories of Intelligence Categorical or
Continuous?
The answer to this question was diﬀerent for the three standard
TOI questions than for the questions about essentialism and
questions about the brain (see Figure 3). Although responses to
the standard assessment items did form a bimodal distribution
(indicating that people either saw intelligence as ﬁxed or as
malleable), responses to the broader sets of questions about
essentialism and the brain were relatively normally distributed.
This diﬀerence can be formally described using a Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test for normality. In this test, a distribution is normal if
the p-value is above 0.05. The distribution of the TOI questions
are not normally distributed (D = 0.1934, p < 0.001, M = 2.77,
SD = 1.025), while the distributions of the essentialism questions
(D= 0.0788, p= 0.1819,M = 3.03, SD= 0.523) and the questions
about the brain (D = 0.071, p = 0.2913, M = 3.41, SD = 0.329)
are normally distributed.
We interpret these data as showing that there is a range of
opinions about whether intelligence is malleable or not, and
range of related opinions about factors that inﬂuence brain
development. People may fall anywhere on a continuum from
believing very strongly that intelligence is malleable to believing
very strongly that intelligence is ﬁxed. The three standard
assessment items allow researchers to distill this continuous
variation into two relatively neat categories (entity theorists and
incremental theorists) into whichmost participants can be sorted.
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FIGURE 3 | Distributions. Histograms of averaged responses for the three
standard TOI assessment items (A); the eight essentialism items (B) and the 26
brain items (C). Only (A) shows a strongly bimodal distribution, indicating that
theories of intelligence only appear categorical when assessed using the three
standard questions. When participants’ beliefs are assessed using a broader set
of questions (as in B,C) theories of intelligence appear to vary along a
continuous dimension from very entity-based/essentialist to very
incremental/non-essentialist.
In Study 1, we set out to answer two questions about
TOI. The ﬁrst was whether these theories are coherent, in the
sense that they show up not only in responses to the three
standard assessment items, but to a wide range of questions
about essentialism and the brain. We concluded that the theories
are indeed coherent: people’s responses on the three standard
items were strongly correlated with their responses to the eight
novel essentialism items and 26 novel brain items. For example,
the more a person believed endorsed the entity TOI, the more
they believed that brain development is determined by genetics
instead of environment, and the less they agreed that a person
could change their brain if they want to. Similarly, the more
a person believed that intelligence can change, the more they
believed that practice and the environment have important eﬀects
on brain development. These correlations suggest that TOI are
not merely an artifact of the three standard survey items typically
used to assess them. They are rich, structured modes of reasoning
deserving of the word ‘theory.’
The second question we set out to answer was whether
the TOI are categorical or continuous. Here, responses to the
broader range of questions suggested that these theories exist
on a continuum from very essentialist/entity-based to very
non-essentialist/incremental. Although participants’ responses to
three standard assessment items did form a bimodal distribution
(suggesting that most people fall into either the entity category or
the incremental category), this was not the case for the broader
range of questions. Participants’ answers to the eight essentialism
questions and the 26 brain questions were relatively normally
distributed, suggesting that most people believe (at least to some
degree) in both ﬁxedness and malleability.
Study 2
Study 1 asked people to reason about abstract statements, but it is
possible for people to hold a coherent set of abstract beliefs, and
not apply those beliefs when reasoning about speciﬁc situations.
In Study 2, we asked people to make judgments about the genetic
and environmental eﬀects on the brain in a concrete scenario.
Materials and Methods
All research activities were overseen and approved by the
Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects Research at the
University of California – Irvine.
Participants
Participants included 68 people were paid $1.00 each to complete
a survey over the internet. Participants were recruited from the
Amazon Mechanical Turk system for human intelligence tasks.
Four participants were excluded because they incorrectly
answered questions that were meant to check whether
participants were reading the questions. According to their
self-reports, the remaining participants were 21–76 years old
(mean = 39) and included 24 males (37.5%) and 40 females
(62.5%). Races reported included 56 Caucasian (87.5%); one
Black/African–American (1.5%), three Other/Multi Racial
(4.7%), two Asian/Paciﬁc Islander (3.1%). Two participants
declined to state their race (3.1%). Participants were also asked
to indicate the highest level of education they had completed.
Answers included post-graduate degree (n = 8, 12.7%), some
graduate school (n = 0, 0%); Bachelor’s degree (n = 24, 38.1%),
Associate’s degree (n = 6, 9.52%); some college, no degree
(n = 13, 20.6%), high school or equivalent (n = 12, 19.0%), and
less than high school (n = 0, 0%).
Materials and Procedures
All participants started out by reading the following vignette:
Scott and Paul are identical twins who were separated at birth
when they were adopted by diﬀerent families. Both Scott and Paul
were adopted into families that had sons who were their same age.
Scott and his adoptive brother Dan attended the same schools
their entire lives, all of which were known for their academic rigor.
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The importance of academics was stressed in the household. Both
Scott and Dan were expected to do well in school. Scott’s adoptive
parents provided tutors, homework help, or any other academic
resource necessary to help Scott and Dan do well in school. Scott
was very motivated to be a good student to please his adoptive
parents.
Paul and his adoptive brother Luke also attended the same
schools their entire lives, all of which were known for their poor
academics. The importance of academics was not stressed in the
household. Instead, Paul’s adoptive parents stressed the importance
of athletics. Both Paul and Luke were expected to play sports and
excel as athletes. Paul’s adoptive parents provided coaches, trainers,
or any other athletic resource necessary to help Paul and Luke do
well in sports. Paul was verymotivated to be a good athlete to please
his adoptive parents.
After reading the vignette, participants answered 18 survey
items: four questions to check whether the participants were
reading the questions, three standard TOI assessment items,
the eight essentialism questions used in Survey 1, and three
questions asking them to predict how similar the twins’ brains
would be to one another, and how similar the twins’ brains
would be to their adoptive brothers. For example, “At age 25,
how diﬀerent are Scott and Paul’s brains? (Scott and Paul are
the identical twins and have never met.)” The 18 questions
were presented in random order. The three standard assessment
items and eight essentialism items used a ﬁve-point Likert
scale with response choices ranging from “Strongly disagree”
to “Strongly agree.” The three questions about the twins used
a seven-point Likert scale with response choices from “Their
brains are entirely diﬀerent (meaning as diﬀerent as two human
brains can be)” to “Their brains are identical.” We used a seven-
point Likert scale for the twin questions because we expected
that reasoning about the twins’ brains might be subtle, and we
wanted to collect ﬁner-grained judgments than a ﬁve-point scale
would provide. All questions are included in Supplementary
Materials.
Results and Discussion
Standard Assessment for Theory of Intelligence
(Three Items)
As in Study 1, we started by averaging each participants’ responses
to the three standard TOI assessment items to create their
TOI score. Mean scores ranged from 1 to 5 (M = 2.799,
SD = 1.141) with higher scores indicating a stronger belief
that intelligence is ﬁxed. There was no correlation between
people’s age and these scores (R2 = 0.00, p = 0.32) nor was
there eﬀects of education [F(4,58) = 1.64, p = 0.177] or gender
[F(1,61) = 0.003, p = 0.96]. There was a marginally signiﬁcant
eﬀect of race [F(3,59) = 2.25, p = 0.09]. A Tukey test revealed
only a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Asian/Paciﬁc Islander and
Caucasian responses [t(57) = 5.82, p < 0.001] where the two
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander participants believed intelligence to be
more malleable than the Caucasian participants.
For the analyses treating TOI as categorical, we sorted
participants into groups as in Study 1, by separating the responses
into terciles: participants with mean scores from 1 to 2.332 were
labeled incremental theorists (n = 31); those with scores from
2.333 to 3.666 were labeled neutral theorists (n = 11); those with
scores from 3.667 to 5 were labeled entity theorists (n = 22).
Essentialism (Eight Items)
We calculated an essentialism score for each person by averaging
over the Eight essentialism questions. These scores ranged from
1.37 to 4.5 (M = 3.24, SD = 0.618) where higher scores
indicate a more essentialized view of intelligence. There was
not a signiﬁcant correlation between age and essentialism scores
(R2 = 0.015, p = 0.324) nor was there an eﬀect of gender
[F(1,61) = 0.279, p = 0.599]. There was a small, marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀect of race on essentialism scores [F(4,58) = 2.55,
p = 0.064]. Post hoc comparisons revealed the only signiﬁcant
diﬀerence to be between the Caucasian participants and the two
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander participants [t(6) = 3.62, p = 0.064] where
the Asian/Paciﬁc Islanders saw intelligence as less essentialized
than the Caucasians did. There was a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect
of education level on people’s essentialism scores [F(4,58) = 2.72,
p < 0.05]. Where those with “some college, no degree” had
slightly more essentialized views of intelligence than those
who indicated they “graduated high school” [t(15) = 4.29,
p< 0.01].
Coherence of theories of intelligence with essentialism
As in Study 1, participants’ TOI scores were correlated with
their responses to the essentialism questions. Treating TOI as
continuous, we found a strong correlation between a person’s
TOI and the degree of essentialism in thinking about the topic
(R2 = 0.45, p < 0.001). The more a person believed intelligence
to be ﬁxed, the more essentialism was evident in their reasoning
about it. Treating TOI as categorical, there was a main eﬀect
of TOI on essentialism responses [F(2,60) = 19.83, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.398]. Tukey contrasts show that incremental theorists
rejected essentialist statements more than entity theorists
[t(47) = 5.97, p < 0.001], as did neutral theorists [t(28) = 4.43,
p< 0.001]. There was not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between neutral
theorists and incremental theorists [t(26) = 1.58, p = 0.377].
Predictions about the Brains of Identical Twins
Separated at Birth
In the following analyses, we compared participants’ intuitions
about the similarity between the biological twins’ brains,
versus the similarity between the adoptive brothers’ brains (see
Figure 4).
Judgments about brothers in the academic household
Treating TOI as continuous, we found a strong correlation
between people’s TOI scores and their judgments about the
brains of the identical twins versus the two adoptive brothers
raised in the ‘academic’ household (the household where the
parents valued and supported academic achievement). The more
a person believed intelligence to be ﬁxed, the more similar they
predicted the identical twins’ brains would be, compared to
their predictions about the similarity of the adoptive brothers
(R2 = 0.23, p< 0.001). Treating TOI as categorical, we found that
a one-way ANOVA revealed the same pattern [F(2,60) = 6.136,
p < 0.005, η2 = 0.162]. Entity theorists predicted that the
biological twins’ brains would be more similar to each other
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FIGURE 4 | Biological versus adoptive brothers. Mean difference in predictions about similarity of biological twins’ versus adoptive brother’s adult brains, with
participants grouped by theory of intelligence. Error bars indicate SE. ∗∗p < 0.01.
than the brains of the adoptive brothers; incremental and neutral
theorists did not make this prediction [entity and incremental
t(44) = 3.267, p < 0.005; entity and neutral t(28) = 2.212,
p< 0.05; neutral and incremental t(27) = 0.943, p = 1.00].
Judgments about brothers in the athletic household
There was a similar correlation between TOI and judgments
about the characters in the athletic household (the household
where the parents valued and supported achievement in sports).
The more a participant believed intelligence to be malleable, the
more similar they believed the adoptive brother’s brains would
be, relative to the biological twins’ brains (R2 = 0.122, p = 0.004).
Thus people who believed intelligence is ﬁxed gave more
weight to heredity in brain development; people who believed
intelligence is malleable gave more weight to environmental
factors. Treating TOI as categorical, we again found a main eﬀect
of TOI group on these judgments [F(2,60) = 3.51, p = 0.0417,
η2 = 0.100]. Speciﬁcally, entity theorists predicted that the brains
of the biological twins would be more similar than the brains
of the adoptive brothers; incremental and neutral theorists did
not share this intuition [entity and incremental t(47) = 2.58,
p < 0.05; entity and neutral t(25) = 0.280, p = 0.28; neutral and
incremental t(26) = 0.49, p = 1.00].
Theories of Intelligence: Categorical or Continuous?
As in Study 1, we were interested in whether people’s TOI (as
assessed by the three standard survey items, as well as by our
novel items) are best treated as a categorical or a continuous
variable. And just as in Study 1, responses to the standard
assessment items were bimodally distributed (indicating that
people either saw intelligence as ﬁxed or as malleable), whereas
responses to the ‘twins’ questions were not. This is replicates the
ﬁnding of Study 1, suggesting that although the three standard
assessment items give the impression that TOI are categorical,
most people actually believe that a combination of genetics and
environment aﬀect the brain, and the relative weight they assign
to those factors varies continuously along a dimension from
emphasizing genetics over environment to emphasizing genetics
and environment equally. Note that the judgments are not
symmetrical: entity theorists assign genetics a much greater role
than incremental and neutral theorists assign to the environment.
Because of the smaller sample size in Study 2, we used
Shapiro–Wilk tests to assess these distributions. As in Study 1,
participant’s responses on the three standard TOI assessment
items were not normally distributed (W = 0.89, p< 0.001). They
fell into a bimodal distribution, with the two modes reﬂecting
‘entity’ and ‘incremental’ TOI. Also as in Study 1, responses to
the essentialism items were normally distributed (W = 0.9749,
p = 0.23). Predictions about the relative similarity of the
biological and adoptive brothers were also normally distributed
(Academic household W = 0.97, p = 0.15, Athletic household
W = 0.97, p = 0.12).
General Discussion
We set out to answer two questions about TOI. The ﬁrst was
whether TOI are coherent and broader than the three questions
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typically used to assess them; the second was whether these
theories are best thought of as discrete categories, or as points
on a continuum.
Coherence and Breadth of Theories of
Intelligence
The word ‘theory’ implies a rich, structured set of beliefs that
allow a person to reason about a particular domain. But TOI
are most often assessed using the same three survey items (Your
intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very
much; You have a certain amount of intelligence and you can’t do
much to change it; You can learn new things, but you can’t really
change your basic intelligence). It seems important to establish
that the TOI that researchers have identiﬁed are not merely an
artifact of those three survey items, but are rather a coherent
set of beliefs that extend beyond those particular statements,
to reasoning about intelligence and the brain in general. In
the present study, we compared people’s responses on the three
standard assessment items to their responses on a broader range
of questions about intelligence and the brain. These included
eight items probing the essentialism in participants’ beliefs
(Studies 1 and 2); 26 items about the brain (Study 1) and three
items about the similarity between pairs of biological versus
adoptive siblings (Study 2).
In each case, we found that participants’ responses on the three
standard assessment questions were strongly correlated with their
responses on the other item types. This was true for Study 1 where
participants were asked about their beliefs in the abstract. For
example, the more a person believed that intelligence is ﬁxed, the
more they believed that a person’s brain is ﬁxed (i.e., determined
by genetics instead of environment) Likewise, the more a person
believed intelligence can change, the more they believed that
a person’s brain could change as a result of practice or the
environment. We also found a correlation in Study 2, where
participants were asked about a more concrete scenario that
described twins separated at birth. In other words, participants’
TOI do seem to be coherent, and do extend beyond the three
statements typically used to assess them. This sits well with
ﬁndings showing folk theories to be coherent in other domains
(e.g., Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992; Lautrey and Mazens, 2004;
Smith, 2007; Shtulman and Schulz, 2008; Shtulman and Calabi,
2012). These ﬁndings provide support for the TOI construct,
and for the continued use of the three standard assessment
items.
Are Theories of Intelligence Categorical or
Continuous?
The second goal of the project was to determine whether TOI
represent discrete categories (which are the way they are usually
treated in the literature) or a continuous dimension. In other
words, is it the case in real life (as in the literature) that
most people fall either in the entity camp or the incremental
camp, and not somewhere in between? In the present paper,
we explored this in two ways. One was to give participants
the three standard assessment items, but to include a neutral
answer option so that participants were not forced to choose
an answer from one side or the other. Second, we looked
at the distribution of responses both for the three standard
items, as well as for the broader set of questions about
intelligence, brain development and the twins separated at birth.
If people’s thinking about the malleability of intelligence naturally
falls into two distinct categories, then people’s responses on
all of these question types should be bimodally distributed,
with responses clustered into two groups, reﬂecting the two
TOI.
The answer to this question turned out to be diﬀerent for the
three standard TOI items than for the other item types. Answers
to the three standard TOI items did form a bimodal distribution,
even though respondents had the option of the neutral response.
However, responses to all of the other item types were normally
distributed. In other words, we did not ﬁnd evidence for two
distinct theories in people’s broader beliefs about intelligence and
the brain. Instead we found a continuum of beliefs. This was true
for abstract questions about essentialism and brain development
as well as for more concrete judgments about the twins separated
at birth and their adoptive brothers.
Conclusion
It seems that the three standard items used to assess TOI do
tap into a deeper and broader set of coherent beliefs, but that
these beliefs exist on a continuum. To be clear, psychologists
working with the TOI construct have not argued that entity
and incremental theorists are separate and ﬁxed categories of
people. On the contrary, many studies have tried to nudge
people away from an entity theory and toward an incremental
theory. For example, Bergen (1991) had some participants read
an essay arguing that traits are malleable, and had others read
an essay arguing that traits are ﬁxed. Participants who read the
argument for malleability were more likely to attribute failure
to situational factors than participants who read the argument
for ﬁxedness. Because of results like this, Dweck et al. (1995a)
have described implicit TOI as stable, but malleable qualities
rather than ﬁxed dispositions. Our data are partially consistent
with this characterization: the theories do seem relatively stable
and coherent, but our data do not suggest that they are
distinct.
The present ﬁndings also add to a growing body of work
on essentialist reasoning about psychological characteristics.
For example, Gelman et al. (2007) found that by third grade,
children are more likely to believe that a trait is stable if
they also believe it is biologically based or innate. Adults and
older children who have essentialist beliefs about one trait tend
to have essentialist beliefs about other traits. Gelman et al.
(2007) point out that essentialist beliefs might build on each
other. For example, a child who thinks that intelligence is ﬁxed
would be more likely to agree that intelligence is biologically
based and that environment has little eﬀect on a person’s
intelligence.
We saw some evidence of this in people’s responses
to the diﬀerent categories of brain-development questions.
Entity theorists were more likely believed that intellectual
and psychological traits are innate, and reﬂect genetics and
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unchanging physical characteristics of the brain. By contrast,
incremental theorists were more likely to believe that brain
development is aﬀected by practice and by the environment, and
that individuals have some control over how their brains develop.
Interestingly, both groups agreed that learning changes the
brain—a belief that seems somewhat contradictory for entity
theorists. Given that our sample of respondents was relatively
highly educated, people may have endorsed the idea that learning
changes the brain as a way of expressing their belief in the value
of education. Or they may explicitly have been taught (as part of
their education) that learning changes the brain. In either case, it
would suggest that people’s essentialist reasoning in the domain of
intelligence is not 100% ironclad—at least in the case of educated
entity theorists.
The current studies add to our understanding of folk
TOI, showing that people’s essentialist beliefs are coherent
across psychological and physical traits (i.e., judgments about
intelligence correspond with judgments about the physical brain)
but also that they are not the separate, distinct and self-contained
theories that wemight imagine them to be. This area of research is
one where, for reasons of clarity of thought or exposition, we have
imposed a categorical structure on what is actually a continuous
dimension. Researchers (including us) ﬁnd it convenient to
talk about ‘entity theorists’ and ‘incremental theorists,’ when
in fact most people are somewhere in between. Describing
TOI as discrete categories has undoubtedly made for clearer
and more engaging stories, while sacriﬁcing some scientiﬁc
precision. Going forward, it is worth thinking about when to
treat TOI as categorical and when to treat them as continuous.
For example, when we (as researchers) are trying to give the
most accurate possible description of folk beliefs, we should
acknowledge that these beliefs exist on a continuum. But when
we (as teachers and translators of science) need to simplify the
story for a broader audience, the easy-to-understand, categorical
story about entity theorists and incremental theorists—while
not, strictly speaking the most accurate—may still be the
best.
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